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On July 20, 2017, under the pen of Kingsbury and Grover, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office published a report on the evidence the Transportation Security Administration (hereafter
“TSA”) provided to support behavioral indicators used “for identifying passengers who may pose a
threat to aviation security” (p. 1). The report’s conclusions were unequivocal:
In our review of all 178 sources TSA cited in support of its revised list of behavioral indicators, we found
that 98% (175 of 178) of the sources do not provide valid evidence applicable to the specific indicators
TSA identified them as supporting (Kingsbury and Grover, 2017, p. 5).
Whilst this report is just one example of how an organization developed and implemented practices
that lack scientific evidence, such a report may also suggest an insufficient dialogue, initiated by
research scientists, with practitioners to adequately promote scientific knowledge. In this opinion
article, our aim is to offer some avenues for thought regarding the reasons why such a dialogue
might sometimes appear to be deficient.
Although numerous publications have addressed the subject and offered various definitions
(e.g., Gergen et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 2004; Beech et al., 2010; Cooren, 2010), authors
generally agree a dialogue is not simply the back and forth communication between two or more
people. A dialogue can be defined as an interaction where parties genuinely engage in activities of
co-construction “to enable something new to emerge from relaxed and non-judgmental curiosity
in order that collective thought becomes coherent” (Beech et al., 2010, p. 1343; see also Bohm,
2003). Therefore, if research scientists and practitioners genuinely want to engage in dialogue “to
develop solutions to problems in the world of practice, and thereby generate insights for the world
of theory” (Beech et al., 2010, p. 1342), they each must fully appreciate the others knowledge. For
research scientists, this includes recognizing the value of the practitioners’ experiential knowledge.
Knowledge gained through experience is essential to real-life decision making within uncertain
situations, especially when there is little to no science (Shön, 1991; Lowman, 2012; Lilienfeld et al.,
2013). However, whilst research scientists may be tempted to question, even undervalue such
knowledge, one should keep in mind that experiential and scientific knowledge are different types
of knowledge developed through different processes. Experiential and scientific knowledge each
have their strengths and weaknesses. For example, rigor can be viewed as a strength for aspects of
scientific knowledge yet a weakness within experiential knowledge and relevance often serves as a
strength for experiential knowledge but may be lacking within scientific understanding (Bartunek
and Rynes, 2014).
Another pivotal issue to the lack of dialogue between research scientists and practitioners may
stem from the integration of knowledge. For example, if practitioners lend a disproportionate
weight to anecdotal evidence and research scientists overestimate the applicability of their results,
there is an immediate limit to what either can learn from the other. To effectively understand such
strengths and weaknesses and to make informed decisions, research scientists should adequately
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relay to practitioners what scientific knowledge is and, what it
is not. For example, in justice systems, many practitioners lack
the knowledge to distinguish science from pseudoscience (e.g.,
Redding et al., 2001; Moreno, 2003; Faigman, 2006; Lilienfeld and
Landfield, 2008; Tadei et al., 2016). In addition, how can research
scientists expect practitioners to embrace scientific knowledge
when science often offers uncertainty?
Whilst science is transient and far from perfect, practitioners
must understand that scientific knowledge is rigorously
examined through the peer review process and subsequently
subjected to the scrutiny of a worldwide community of
research scientists who can bring invaluable benefit to real-life
decision making. On the other hand, “alternative” science, or
pseudoscience, rising in popularity and frequently offering
grandiose solutions without adequate evidence (Lilienfeld et al.,
2003), requires blind trust. Whilst nothing can justify the use
of pseudoscience, anecdotal evidence can be informative when
there is little to no science regarding a specific topic. Nonetheless,
if an issue has been extensively studied by research scientists, the
use of anecdotal evidence at the expense of scientific knowledge,
more so as a rationale to spend taxpayers’ money, should at the
very least raise serious questions.
There is no doubt that the TSA as well as other security
and law organizations long for better public safety, yet failing
to embrace evidence-based practices stemming from research
into deception detection can result in dire consequences.
Practitioners can, in perfectly good faith, develop and implement
procedures and practices that would not stand up to critical
examination. Research scientists need to acknowledge that
practitioners have a significant belief in their procedures
and practices. Therefore, to improve the dialogue with
practitioners, research scientists should reduce outright
negativity, bring about constructive criticism and take a
step forward in understanding the practitioners’ procedures
and practices as a whole. For example, an organization
as crucial as the TSA clearly portrays their justifications
for their methods, justifications that can fall outside of
the area of expertise of research scientists. Whilst research
scientists are often dismissive of their methods, without an
improvement in dialogue, a stalemate will be reached in
terms of developing security protocols, of which the risks are
catastrophic.
Obviously, such a task is not without challenges, starting
with the time an improvement in dialogue requires. However,
whereas research scientists remain committed to carry out
research that will serve in real-life situations, dual narratives to
allow both research scientists and practitioners to inform one
another is of the utmost importance. Research scientists should
therefore engage in a dialogue with the TSA as well as other
security and law organizations and invite them to jointly work
on improving their current methods and on developing and
implementing procedures and practices that will stand up to
critical examination.
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